R&PM represents civil servant salaries and other administrative overhead. Shuttle-related facilities construction amounts were reported and identified in the CoF account. Project development was primarily a function of the R&D account. For clarity, these data are omitted from charts.Дuring the period of the Space Shuttle's development, NASA's budget was divided into three major accounts: Research &В Development (R&D), Construction of Facilities (CoF), and Research & Program Management (R&PM). fiscal year from July 1st to October 1st of each year. Obligations reflect contracted amounts, and actual expenditures may vary somewhat in both absolute terms and in timing.ДЄll total costs reported here include obligations made during the 1976 transition quarter-a 3-month period that accommodated a shift of the start of the U.S. Costs begin to decline when most of the challenging engineering problems have been solved and the project moves into regular operations.Дollar amounts reflect actual obligations reported in NASA'sВ budget requests between the fiscal years 19. The project displays a classic aerospace development cost curve, with the project starting modestly, rapidly increasing as it gains steam, staff, and complexity as a result of moving from paper design to testing physical hardware, and peaking in resource needs a few years prior to its first launch. It takes time to design, refine, and build reliable flight hardware, and the Shuttle was no exception. The costs to develop and build the Shuttle were not all spent at once. 'Launch & Landing' activities accounted for the necessary ground equipment and procedures to prepare the Shuttle for launch and refurbishment for reuse.ДЄnother critical component, generally omitted in the discussion of spaceflight development, is the construction of the ground elements necessary to support launch, landing, and post-flight processing-all of which had to be designed and built specifically to the needs of the STS project. вЂњMore or less what stalled the Russian moon landing was they tried to putВ a whole lot of engines on the bottom ofВ their rocket because they couldnвЂ™t build the big ones,' he said.В 'And that never did work out.The 'Space Shuttle' is a colloquial term for the Space Transportation System (STS), which consists of the orbiter, the reusable RS-25 engines, the external fuel tank, and the solid rocket boosters. The N1В explodedВ each time it launched in the late 1960s and early '70s and wasВ scrapped. The Saturn V, in comparison,В hadВ five large engines. He noted how the Soviets'В answer to the AmericanВ Saturn V,В their failed N1 rocket,В was done in by its complex assortment ofВ 30 small rocket engines. ThoseВ engines were to be based on development work done by Detroit Diesel Allison DivisionВ in collaboration with Rolls Royce.Дrye said this large number of jet engines could have causedВ problemsВ for Chrysler's design. When returning to Earth, theВ SERV was to guide itself to a gentleВ landing by using 28 jet engines. According to NASA, the aerospikeВ design canВ theoretically provideВ more efficient thrust as a spacecraft gainsВ altitude in its journey toВ orbit. While a typical rocket engine features a bell nozzle that constricts expanding gasses, an aerospike engine is shaped like a bell turned inside out and upside down. The main vehicle's engine, called an aerospike engine, would have generated even more thrust than the space shuttle's engines. In a phone interview from his home outside Toronto, Drye said theВ Chrysler SERV was an extremelyВ unconventional spacecraft and probably more advanced than the space shuttle that came to be. Space historian DryeВ considered that possibility and published a detailed analysis of Chrysler's spaceship inВ his blogВ 'False Steps: The Space Race as it might have been.' Would Chrysler'sВ spacecraft have been betterВ than the space shuttle? Today theВ only way that NASA astronauts can reach the International Space StationВ isВ by buying seats onВ Soyuz spacecraft.

In the end, the shuttles made only three to eight flightsВ per year at a high cost of about $775 million per trip. Two shuttles and their crews were lost to accidents by the time theВ program stopped in 2011. The shuttle's first flight was repeatedly delayed until 1981 and theВ fleet never achieved early projections ofВ as many as 50 space trips per year. AlthoughВ the space shuttle bested Chrysler's proposed spacecraft inВ designВ competition, the shuttle failed to achieve its originalВ goals of providing frequent and inexpensive access to space.

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